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Abstract
As a fundamental theorem in number theory, the Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT) is widely used to construct cryptographic
primitives. This paper investigates the security of a class of image encryption schemes based on CRT, referred to as CECRT.
Making use of some properties of CRT, the equivalent secret key of CECRT can be recovered efficiently. The required
number of pairs of chosen plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext is only (1 + d(log2 L)/le). The attack complexity is only
O(L), where L is the plaintext length and l is the number of bits representing a plaintext symbol. In addition, other defects of
CECRT such as invalid compression function and low sensitivity to plaintext, are reported. The work in this paper will help
clarify positive role of CRT in cryptology.
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1. Introduction
Both the transmission and the storage of digital data have
dual requirements of high operating efficiency and security,
which lead to the joint operations of compression and en-
cryption. According to the order of the operations, joint
compression and encryption schemes can be categorized
into three classes: encryption on compressed data [1, 2, 3];
simultaneous compression and encryption [4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
compression on encrypted data [9, 10, 11]. Recently, Chi-
nese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is used in constructing si-
multaneous compression and encryption schemes or the ba-
sis of some efficient encryption algorithms.
The earliest known example of CRT can be found in
the book, The Mathematical Classic of Sunzi, written by
Chinese mathematician Sun Tzu in the fifth century. In
1247, another Chinese mathematician Jiushao Qin gener-
alized it into a statement about simultaneous congruences
and provided the complete solution in Mathematical Trea-
tise in Nine Sections [12]. Antiquity of Chinese mathemati-
cians’ study on the remainder problem (and maybe sparsity
of Chinese mathematicians’ contribution to classic mathe-
matics) made the complete form of the statement be called
Chinese Remainder Theorem. As a fundamental theorem
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in number theory, it has been widely used in various fields
of information security, e.g. speed up implementation of
the RSA algorithm [13, 14], secret sharing [15], and secure
code [16]. For a comprehensive survey of the cryptographic
applications of CRT and chaos-based cryptanalysis, please
refer to [17] and [18], respectively.
As reviewed in [19, Sec. 4.3.2], CRT supports the mod-
ular representation of a large number (dividend) as a set
of numbers (remainders) in some given small domains. It
converts the addition, subtraction, and multiplication of
large numbers into very simple operations on small num-
bers. In addition, the conversion provides simultaneous op-
erations on different moduli for parallel computing. Con-
sidering these benefits, a number of symmetric encryption
schemes based on CRT have been proposed since 2001.
The schemes designed in [20, 21, 22, 23] all consider the
gray level of some plain-image pixels as remainders, and
the summing divisor of CRT as the cipher-element, where
the moduli sequences are considered as the secret key or
key stream. Conversely, the scheme proposed in [24] com-
bines the gray levels of some plain-image pixels into a
big divisor and stores the smaller remainder as the cipher-
elements. Reference [25] follows this idea and further en-
crypts the remainders in a stream cipher mode, using two
pseudo-random number sequences (PRNS). In 2013, an im-
age encryption scheme, called CECRT in this paper, was
proposed [26]. It first permutes the pixels of the plain-
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image and then performs the CRT operations as reported in
[20, 21, 22, 23]. In [22, 26], the authors claimed that their
schemes possess the feature of simultaneous compression
and encryption. Since cryptanalysis is an integral work to
evaluate security level of any encryption scheme [27], it is
important to analyze security properties of the encryption
schemes based on CRT.
As CECRT is a typical example of the class of symmetric
encryption schemes based on CRT and almost all security
defects of other schemes can be found in it, we will focus
on breaking CECRT. We found a property of CRT on the
relationship among the product of some moduli, the divi-
sor corresponding to a special set of remainders, and the
divisor. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that the property of CRT is reported. Based on it, we prove
that the diffusion part of CECRT can be compromised ef-
ficiently using only a pair of chosen-plaintext and the cor-
responding ciphertext. Then, the permutation part of CE-
CRT can be broken using the existing standard cryptanaly-
sis methods. In addition, the following security defects of
CECRT are also reported: 1) the compression performance
of CECRT is marginal and even negative; 2) the ciphertext
is not sensitive to changes in the plaintext; 3) the moduli of
CRT are not suitable to be used as a sub-key.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2,
CECRT is briefly described. Then, the comprehensive
cryptanalyses on CECRT are presented in Sec. 3, together
with detailed experimental results. The last section con-
cludes the paper.
2. Description of CECRT
The kernel of CECRT relies on the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, which states that the system of linear congru-
ences
{x ≡ qi (mod mi)}ti=1 (1)
has unique solution
x ≡
t∑
i=1
eim˜iqi (mod m), (2)
when m1,m2, . . . ,mt are coprime integers, where m˜i =
m/mi, m =
∏t
i=1 mi, (eim˜i) ≡ 1 (mod mi), {qi}ti=1 ⊂ Z, and
t is an integer larger than or equal to one. Let P = {pi}Li=1
and C = {ci}L/ki=1 denote the plaintext and the corresponding
ciphertext, respectively, where k is the number of plaintext
symbols encrypted at one time. Without loss of generality,
L is assumed to be a multiple of k. Then, the basic opera-
tions of CECRT are described as follows1.
1For the sake of completeness, some notations in the original pa-
per [26] are modified provided that the essential form of CECRT is not
changed.
• The secret key consists of k coprime integers, rep-
resented as an ordered set N = (ni)ki=1, and (x0, y0,
a1, a2, b1, b2, b3), where ni ≥ 256, (x0, y0) and
(a1, a2, b1, b2, b3) are, respectively, the initial condi-
tion and the control parameters of the 2D hyper-
chaotic systemxn+1 = a1xn + a2yn,yn+1 = b1 + b2x2n + b3yn, (3)
.
• The initialization process: 1) Iterate the chaotic sys-
tem (3) for 500 + L times from the initial condition
(x0, y0) with the control parameters (a1, a2, b1, b2, b3)
and obtain two PRNS X = {xi}Li=1 and Y = {yi}Li=1 af-
ter discarded the first 500 states; 2) Sort X and Y in
ascending order, then derive two intermediate permu-
tation sequences U = {u(i)}Li=1 and V = {v(i)}Li=1 by
comparing X and Y with their sorted versions, respec-
tively, where xu(i) denotes the i-th smallest element of
X and yv(i) denotes the i-th smallest element of Y; 3)
Combine the two vectors U and V and obtain a permu-
tation relation vector (a bijective map on the entities
of a plaintext) W = {w(i)}Li=1, where w(i) = v(u(i)).
• The encryption process is comprised of the following
two basic operations:
1) Permutation: For i = 1 ∼ L, set
hi = pw(i).
2) Confusion: For j = 1 ∼ L/k, set c j as
the solution of the system of linear congruences{
x ≡ h( j−1)k+i (mod ni)
}k
i=1
, namely
c j =
k∑
i=1
ein˜i · pw(( j−1)k+i) mod n, (4)
where n˜i = (
∏k
j=1 n j)/ni, and
(ein˜i) ≡ 1 (mod ni). (5)
• The decryption process consists of two steps:
1) Inverse Confusion: For i = 1 ∼ L, set
hi = c(b(i−1)/kc+1) mod n((i−1) mod k+1). (6)
2) Inverse Permutation: For i = 1 ∼ L, set
pi = hw−1(i),
where W−1 = {w−1(i)}Li=1 is the inverse of W.
2
3. Cryptanalysis
To carry out an efficient chosen-plaintext attack on CE-
CRT, some properties of Chinese Remainder Theorem are
introduced first.
3.1. Properties of Chinese Remainder Theorem
Property 1. Given a set {si}ri=1 ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , t}, one has
r∏
i=1
msi = gcd
 r∑
i=1
(esi m˜si ) − 1,m
 (7)
and
t−r∏
i=1
mti = gcd
 r∑
i=1
(esi m˜si ),
t−r∏
i=1
mti
 , (8)
where {ti}t−ri=1 = {1, 2, · · · , t} − {si}ri=1.
Proof. Given i ∈ {1, · · · , r}, (esi m˜si ) ≡ 1 (mod msi ), one
can obtain
gcd(esi m˜si − 1,msi ) = msi . (9)
For any j ∈ {1, · · · , r} and j , i, gcd(es j m˜s j ,msi ) = msi .
Therefore, one gets
gcd
 r∑
j=1, j,i
(es j m˜s j ),msi
 = msi . (10)
Combining Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), the result is
gcd
 r∑
j=1
(es j m˜s j ) − 1,msi
 = msi .
Referring to Fact 1, it can be derived that
r∏
i=1
msi =
r∏
i=1
gcd
 r∑
j=1
(es j m˜s j ) − 1,msi

= gcd
 r∑
i=1
(esi m˜si ) − 1,
r∏
i=1
msi
 . (11)
As
r∑
j=1
(
es j m˜s j
)
=
r∑
j=1
(
es j ·
∏r
i=1 msi
ms j
· m∏r
i=1 msi
)
,
one can get
m∏r
i=1 msi
= gcd
 r∑
j=1
(es j m˜s j ),
m∏r
i=1 msi
 ,
which is the same as Eq. (8). Referring to Proposition 1,
one can obtain
gcd
 r∑
i=1
(esi m˜si ) − 1,
m∏r
i=1 msi
 = 1 (12)
from the above equation. Multiplying the two sides of
Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), respectively, one has
r∏
i=1
msi = gcd
 r∑
i=1
(esi m˜si ) − 1,
r∏
i=1
msi

· gcd
 r∑
i=1
(esi m˜si ) − 1,
m∏r
i=1 msi

= gcd
 r∑
i=1
(esi m˜si ) − 1,m
 .
Fact 1. Given three integers a, b and c. If gcd(b, c) = 1,
then
gcd(a, bc) = gcd(a, b) · gcd(a, c).
Proposition 1. Given two integers a, b and |a| + |b| , 0. If
gcd(a, b) = b, then gcd(a − 1, b) = 1.
Proof. Since gcd(a, b) = b, there exists an integer k such
that a = k · b. Then, gcd(a − 1, b) = gcd(k · b − 1, b) =
gcd((k− 1) · b + (b− 1), b) = gcd(b− 1, b) = gcd(b− 1, (b−
1) + 1) = gcd(b − 1, 1) = 1.
Property 2. The coefficients of CRT, {ei}ti=1, {m˜i}ti=1, satisfy
t∑
i=1
eim˜i ≡ 1 (mod m). (13)
Proof. In the linear congruences shown in Eq. (1), assume
qi ≡ 1. Obviously, x = 1. As the solution is unique, one
can obtain Eq. (13) by setting the values of x and {qi}ti=1 in
Eq. (2).
Property 3. Equation (1) and Eq. (2) determine a pair of
reciprocal bijective map between Zm and {(q1, q2, · · · , qt)},
where qi goes through Zmi for i = 1 ∼ t.
Proof. Obviously, Eq. (1) determines a bijective map be-
tween Zm and {(q1, q2, · · · , qt)}. As the solution of Eq. (2)
is unique, one can assure that the map determined by Eq. (2)
is the reciprocal of that confirmed by Eq. (1).
3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack
3.2.1. Determining the modulus n =
∏k
i=1 ni
Assume the ciphertext symbols distribute uniformly, one
has
Prob
(
max
(
{ci}L/ki=1
)
, (n − 1)
)
= (1 − 1/n)L/k .
As f (n) = (1 − 1/n)n is a monotonic increasing function,
0.31 < f (n) < lim
n→∞ (1 − 1/n)
n = e−1 when n > 3. In gen-
eral, (L/k) << n, one has 0.31 < f (n) < (1 − 1/n)L/k. As a
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result, the modulus n is not equal to max
(
{ci}L/ki=1
)
+ 1 with
a negligible probability.
The value of the modulus n can be guessed from the
above approximated value and then be verified by check-
ing its coincidence with the values of its factors obtained in
the forthcoming attack. Besides this, one can also recover
it from the ciphertext of a chosen-plaintext or a known-
plaintext of special format such as a binary image. If
P = {pi}Li=1 ⊂ {0, 1}, then one can assure 1 ≤ S ≤ 2k
from Eq. (4), where S denotes the cardinality of B, the set
containing different numbers in the corresponding cipher-
text. Add up each pair of the elements in B and put all the
results into an array B̂ of upper limit size
(
2k
2
)
= 2k−1(2k−1).
From Property 3, one can see that there is at most one ele-
ment in B̂ which is equal to 1. By Property 2, one can as-
sure that the element in B possessing the highest frequency
is n + 1 since about S/2 − 1 elements in B̂ are equal to
(n + 1) ∈ (1, 2n − 2]. Other elements exist at a probability
much lower than (S/2−1)/
(
S
2
)
= S−2S (S−1) when S approaches
2k. Therefore, the value of n can be easily found using one
of the three methods described above.
3.2.2. Recovering the unordered set {ni}ki=1
Once the value of n has been confirmed, the elements in
N may be recovered by factoring it. However, the com-
putational complexity is extremely high, especially when n
is very large. Fortunately, this can be performed efficiently
by comparing the above chosen-plaintext and its ciphertext.
As for the binary plaintext, one can obtain the following
Proposition from Eq. (4) and Property 1.
Proposition 2. When the plaintext P = {pi}Li=1 ⊂ {0, 1}, its
corresponding ciphertext satisfies
gcd(c j − 1, n) =
r∏
i=1
nsi
and
gcd(c j, n) =
(
n∏r
i=1 nsi
)
· d,
where
{si}ri=1 = {i | pw(( j−1)k+i) = 1, i = 1 ∼ k}, (14)
d divides n exactly, and j = 1 ∼ L/k.
From Proposition 2, one can see that all the elements of
N̂ come from the elements in {ni}ki=1 or multiple of their
products (maybe themselves), where
N̂ = {gcd(c j − 1, n), gcd(c j, n), n/ gcd(c j − 1, n)}L/kj=1.
Making use of the properties of N̂, {ni}ki=1 can be recovered
by the following steps:
• Step 1: Set N˜ with the smallest numbers in N̂ which
are co-prime with each other. If the cardinality of N˜ is
equal to k, one can assure that N˜ = {ni}ki=1 and stops
the search.
• Step 2: For any two elements of N̂, add the greatest
common divisor (gcd) of them to N̂ if the gcd is not
equal to one.
• Step 3: For any two elements of N̂, add the quotient of
them into N̂ if one can be divided with no remainder
by another. Go to Step 1.
Obviously, the above attack can be carried out in the
same way if any two chosen-plaintexts, whose difference is
a binary text, and the corresponding ciphertexts are avail-
able.
3.2.3. Breaking the permutation part of CECRT
From Proposition 3, one can see that N̂ is equivalent to N
in terms of the function on decrypting CECRT. This means
that CECRT is reduced to a permutation-only encryption
scheme once the unordered set N̂ has been recovered. By
the general cryptanalysis method based on multi-branch
tree proposed in [28], the equivalent permutation part of
CECRT can be revealed from d(log2 L)/le pairs of chosen-
plaintext, where l is the number of bits representing a plain-
text symbol [29]. Note that the binary chosen-plaintext
used in the above sub-section can also be employed to ver-
ify some permutation relations utilizing Eq. (14).
Proposition 3. The order of the elements in set {ni}ki=1 has
no influence on the decryption of CECRT.
Proof. Once the set {ni}ki=1 has been determined, one can
get an approximate version of N (denoted as N∗), with ele-
ments of N in any order, namely,
N∗ = N · T,
where T is a permutation matrix of size k×k. From Eq. (6),
the approximate of {hi}ki=1 corresponding to T can be calcu-
lated by (
h∗( j−1)·k+i
)k
i=1
=
(
h( j−1)·k+i
)k
i=1
· T
=
(
pw(( j−1)·k+i)
)k
i=1
· T, (15)
where j = 1 ∼ L/k. Denote W˜ by
W˜ = W · T̂,
where T̂ = diag(T, · · · ,T) is a permutation matrix of size
L × L, whose main diagonal blocks are all T. Obviously,
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one has
W˜−1 = W−1 · T̂−1
= W−1 · diag(T−1, · · · ,T−1). (16)
Combining Eq. (15) and Eq. (16), one can assure that the
influence of T on the decryption of CECRT is elliminated.
3.2.4. Analyzing performance of the breaking method
The probability that the sub-key for confusion in CECRT
can be exactly recovered depends on whether N̂ contains
independent information of ni, i = 1 ∼ k. It is difficult to
work out the exact probability. However, by a large num-
ber of random experiments, we found that this probability
approaches one when the percentage of non-zero elements
in the available chosen plaintext is not too small. It is easy
to verify that the complexity of recovering {ni}ki=1 is O(L).
Although the sub-key used in the permutation part is dif-
ficult to be determined, its equivalent version W can be
fully revealed by some chosen plaintexts. It can also be
recovered at a very high accuracy even if only some known
plaintexts are available [29]. Utilizing the data structure
of multi-branch tree, intersection of the multiple permu-
tation relations generated by the known plaintexts can be
converted into linear operation of visit. So, the complexity
required in recovering equivalent version of the permuta-
tion part is O(L) [28].
3.2.5. Verifying the breaking method with experimental re-
sults
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed chosen-
plaintext attack, a large number of experiments have been
performed using plain-images of various sizes. Here a typi-
cal example is shown. In this experiment, the secret param-
eters of CECRT are chosen as follows: (n1, n2, n3, n4) =
(311, 313, 317, 293), (x0, y0) = (0.0394, 0.001) and
(a1, a2, b1, b2, b3) = (−0.95, −1.3,−0.45, 2.4, 1.05), which
is the key configuration used in [26]. The available infor-
mation for breaking the confusion sub-key in CECRT in-
cludes the binary image “Bricks” of size 512 × 512 and
the corresponding cipher-image. They are depicted in
Fig. 1, where four consecutive pixels are used to denote
one cipher-element, and the width is the same as that of the
plain-image.
As shown in Fig. 2a), distribution of the elements in B̂
is not uniform and one element exists at a much higher
probability than others, which agrees with the above
analysis. To further verify this, distribution of the elements
in B̂ when k = 6, 8, 10 are also plotted in Fig. 2, where
{ni}6i=1 = (419, 323, 649, 501, 302, 449}, {ni}8i=1 = (573, 593,
443, 577, 341, 428, 293, 541), {ni}10i=1 = (323, 273, 263,
a)
b)
Figure 1: The binary plain-image “Bricks” and the corresponding cipher-
image: a) the plain-image; b) the cipher-image.
349, 625, 409, 436, 451, 389, 479), respectively. As
a result, n = 311 · 313 · 317 · 293 = 9041315183
is easily obtained. Then, one can get N̂ =
{30857731, 91709, 98587, 29071753, 28885991, 28521499, 928
81, 91123, 99221, 311, 97343, 317, 313, 293}. In this case,
{ni}4i=1 can be recovered in the first search step. Finally,dlog2(512 · 512)/8e = 3 chosen plain-images are employed
to recover the permutation relation vector. As the detailed
results of general cryptanalysis problems have been pre-
sented in [30, 29, 28], the related experimental results are
omitted here.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
x 109
0
3
7
a) k = 4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
x 1015
0
15
31
b) k = 6
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
x 1021
0
57
127
c) k = 8
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
x 1025
0
240
510
d) k = 10
Cardinality: 825
Cardinality: 69
Cardinality: 9579
Cardinality: 95694
Figure 2: Distribution of the elements in B̂ when k = 4, 6, 8, 10.
3.3. Other defects of CECRT
Obviously, CECRT encrypts any plaintext of fixed value
as ciphertext having a constant value. In particular, this en-
cryption scheme fails to encrypt the fixed plaintext having
only zero value. Besides these, CECRT suffers from the
following defects.
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• Invalid compression of CECRT By Property 3 of CRT,
one can find that the function defined by CRT is bijec-
tive. In fact, every lossless compression algorithm is a
bijective function between the message being encoded
and the codeword. The size of the message domain is
substantially reduced by extracting the redundancy ex-
ist in the original message. However, there is no such
operation in CECRT. Refer to Eq. (4), one can calcu-
late the ratio between the bit length of the j-th cipher-
element and that of the corresponding plain-element:
dlog2 ne∑k
i=1dlog2 pw(( j−1)k+i))e
≥ d
∑k
i=1 log2 nie∑k
i=1dlog2(ni)e
≥
∑k
i=1dlog2 nie − (k − 1)∑k
i=1dlog2 nie
= 1 − k − 1∑k
i=1dlog2 nie
.
As ni ≥ 256, the above ratio is greater than or
equal to 7+(1/k)8 , which means that the compres-
sion performance of CECRT is marginal. Even
worse, it may produce a ciphertext which is longer
than the plaintext. For the cipher-image shown
in Fig. 1b), one can find that the expansion ratio
is dlog2(311)e+dlog2(313)e+dlog2(317)e+dlog2(293)e4·8 =
9+9+9+9
32 =
36/32 = 9/8.
• Low sensitivity with respect to change of plaintext
A secure cryptographic algorithm is expected to pos-
sess the avalanche effect, i.e., a tiny change in plain-
text will cause each bit of the ciphertext change at a
probability of one half. Unfortunately, CECRT fails
to have this desired property. When two plaintexts
P = {pi}Li=1 and P∗ = {p∗i }Li=1 satisfying pw(( j−1)k+i) −
p∗w(( j−1)k+i) ≡ d for one j, one can assure that the dif-
ference of the corresponding cipher-elements is (c j −
c∗j) =
∑k
i=1(ein˜i)d mod n = d mod n. The low sensi-
tivity with respect to a general change of plaintext can
be supported by the findings in [31], which proved that
the recovery of a large integer from its remainders us-
ing CRT is not sensitive to the change (error) in the
remainders.
• Improper usage of CRT moduli as sub-key
As mentioned in [19], the moduli of CRT can be sim-
ply set as some powers of 2 minus one when they are
fixed parameters. However, the configuration become
much complex when they are dynamic. This is at-
tributed to the fact that the probability that any k posi-
tive integers are relatively prime is given by
Ak =
∏
p prime
(
1 − 1
p
)k−1 (
1 +
k − 1
p
)
[32]. The value of Ak decreases exponentially with
respect to k, where A3 ≈ 0.286, A8 ≈ 0.001, and
A10 < 10−4. From Eq. (4), one can see that CECRT
of a given secret key generates at most 2k different
cipher-elements. When the plaintext is gray-scale im-
age, the value of k should not be less than 8. There-
fore, an efficient scheme for generating a set of co-
prime integers under the control of a secret key has
to be found. Otherwise, it would cost a large amount
of computation to search and verify eligible sub-keys.
In addition, a change in ni only influences the decryp-
tion of 1/k plain-elements, which hardly meets the re-
quirement of a secure encryption scheme, e.g. a small
change in the key should cause a drastic change in the
reconstructed plaintext.
4. Conclusion
The security of a class of encryption schemes using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem has been analyzed in detail.
Based on some properties of CRT, the sub-key used in the
confusion part of CECRT can be easily recovered with only
one pair of chosen plaintext and the corresponding cipher-
text. Then, the permutation part can be broken with the
reported general method. In addition, other defects of CE-
CRT are reported to facilitate the proper use of CRT in
cryptography. The work in this paper may be extended
to analyze the security of other cryptographic applications
also based on CRT.
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